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FRANKFURT At the heart of the current crisis of the European Union lies a more 
fundamental crisis of the national foreign-policy strategies of several key member states. 
Germany is not alone in this, but it stands out for three reasons: It plays a central role at 
the heart of the enlarged European Union by virtue of its location and size; it faces its 
most severe social and economic crisis in decades, and it is governed by a new generation 
of politicians who have shed inhibitions about using German power. 
 
These factors have led to a major shift in Germany's traditional Europeanist outlook. The 
code word is "normalization." Since Chancellor Gerhard Schröder came to power in 
1998, "normalization" has accelerated every year as Berlin has struggled to reconcile its 
increasing political ambition with its declining social and economic competitiveness. 
 
When President Jacques Chirac of France and Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain meet 
with Schröder in Berlin this week, they will be closely watched all over Europe. The Big 
Three will go out of their way to reassure fellow Europeans that a "directorate" of 
Germany, France and Britain is not in the air. They are right to the extent that there is 
little strategic common ground so far uniting Paris, London and Berlin beyond day-to-day 
European politics. What the meeting in Berlin will confirm, however, isthat Germany has 
finally become as "normal" a European power as Britain or France. 
 
Recall three key events over the past 12 months: Schröder's readiness to openly confront 
President George W. Bush over the Iraq war together with Vladimir Putin and Chirac; 
Berlin's reckless push with Paris to suspend the stability pact, and Germany's 
uncompromising insistence at the Brussels summit in December to stick to the formula of 
the ill-starred European constitution which would have raised Germany's power and 
status within the EU. 
 
To be sure, German "normality" can do some good. Schröder, Blair and Chirac will most 
likely arrive at a few useful formulas for enhancing European security cooperation, 
thereby bridging an important gap that opened in the run-up to the Iraq war. But those 
European leaders not invited to Berlin are still right to be suspicious, because Schröder is openly breaking with an old rule of Germany's European policy: avoiding any appearance 
that Germany is ganging up with the biggest kids on the block. 
 
What's wrong with that? Isn't there a leadership gap in Europe and hasn't Europe been 
longing for a normal Germany? 
 
Yes and no. To German ears, "normality" has always had an ambiguous ring. Well into 
the 1980s, most Germans took pride in being not a "normal," but rather a "civilian 
power." This reconciled intense feelings of shame for Germany's Nazi past with a sense 
of pride for the Federal Republic's achievements. But the exercise of civilian power - 
sending checks but not troops - came to seem increasingly untenable after German 
unification. NATO made requests for German troops from the Balkans to Afghanistan, 
and the Germans soon relearned the lesson that soft power was not a key currency in the 
great power game. 
 
However, since domestic bills were rising rapidly, the needed hard-power resources were 
not to be found in the military realm. Votes and status in European decision-making were 
much more important - which is why Schröder has been pushing hard ever since the Nice 
summit for a measure of recognition of Germany's elevated status. This is not what 
Germany's neighbors had in mind when they asked for more German "normality." 
 
The irony here is that German acceptance of a "normal" European standard of national 
interest is threatening to further undermine the European Union's fragile foundation. The 
opening shots over the European Commission's budget planning are only the most recent 
sign that European solidarity and "normal" national interests do not match. 
 
If the Big Three meeting in Berlin does yield a joint vision for Europe's future it may well 
be to make Europe safe for this "normality." Europe's Lilliputians ought to say no to this, 
not least because neither a German Europe, nor a French nor British one, would be to 
the benefit of all. 
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